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1952 petitioner
was indicted in a federal court, charged with illegal sales of narcotics. During
direct examination by his counsel, petitioner denied ever having had possession of narcotics. On cross-examination by the government, petitioner repeated his denial and continued to do so even when the government questioned
him, over his objection, concerning a heroin capsule unlawfully seized in his
home in 1950. Evidence of the unlawful seizure in 1950 had been ruled
inadmissible in an earlier trial. Petitioner's denials were squarely in conflict
with an affidavit he had filed at the earlier trialj1 In rebuttal, the govemment introduced testimony showing the seizure of the capsule from the defendant in 1950. The trial judge admitted the evidence of the previous seizure
and charged the jury that the testimony was admitted solely for purposes of
impeaching petitioner's credibility. Petitioner was convicted, and the court
of appeals affirmed. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting. In a prosecution for unlawful sales of narcotics, the assertion by petitioner on direct examination that
he had never possessed any narcotics opened the door, solely for the purpose
of attacking his credibility, to evidence that narcotics had been unlawfully
seized from him in connection with an earlier prosecution. Walder v. United
States, •347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354 (1954).
Effective protection of basic civil liberties often conflicts with society's
interest in efficient law enforcement This is especially true with respect to
the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.2 The substantive content of this freedom and the sanctions used
to prevent illegal police activities represent a compromise between the concern
for individual liberty and the desire for vigorous law enforcement.3 In Weeks
11. United States4 the Supreme Court resolved the conBict in favor of the agCoNSTITOTIONAL

.AS BBARINc ON" CmmmILITY OF DEFENDAN'l"s TESTIMONY-In

1 The affidavits were filed pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
41(e), 18 U.S.C. (1952).
2 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef£ects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT., Amend.
IV.
a See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925).
4 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). 0£ course, the exclusionary rule announced
in the Weeks case applies only to the federal courts. In hvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
74 S.Ct. 381 (1954), the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the
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grieved defendant, excluding from evidence in the federal courts the fruits of
an illegal search conducted by federal officers. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States5 the Weeks rule was extended to prohibit the government from
making indirect use of the evidence obtained through an unlawful search and
seizure to secure a conviction; and in Nardone v. United States6 the Court
stated that the government could not use leads obtained from such a search
and seizure for that purpose. Certainly it is difficult to reconcile the holding
of the principal case with a too literal interpretation of the words of Justice
Holmes in the Silverthorne case, when he said, "The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not
be used at all."1 When, as in the present case, the defendant is caught in
a deliberate perjury through the use of evidence not otherwise admissible,
the psychological effect on the jury cannot be underestimated. Even with
the careful limitations imposed by the trial judge, it is nevertheless improbable
that a jury can completely dismiss the subjective implications of such evidence
from their minds. It would appear that if the direct examination of the
petitioner in the instant case had concerned elements of the crime charged,
then the evidence of the previous seizure would not have been admissible,
under the rules of the Weeks, Silverthorne, and Nardone cases. However,
it is a familiar rule of evidence that while the prosecution is not permitted to
inquire into the character of the defendant, yet, once the defendant himself,
or more commonly witnesses for him, attempt to prove his good character,
which apparently petitioner's counsel attempted to do in the instant case by
asking the broad question concerning previous possession of narcotics, 8 then
he has opened the door to attacks upon his reputation by the prosecution.9
admission in state courts of evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures, except where
the illegal search involves an assault upon the person. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
72 S.Ct. 205 (1951), is illustrative of the exception.
1> 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920).
6 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939).
1 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, note 5 supra, at 392.
s Unless the very broad question concerning previous possession of narcotics was
asked by counsel in an attempt to establish the good name of his client, it appears that it
was completely out of place and inadmissible, for it does not tend to establish or destroy
any element of the offense with which the defendant was charged.
9 Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213 (1948), for a discussion
of this principle. The Court said, at page 479: "The price a defendant must pay for
attempting to prove his good name is to throw open the entire subject which the law has
kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields
him. The prosecution may pursue the inquiry with contradictory witnesses to show that
damaging rumors, whether or not well-grounded, were aRoat-for it is not the man that
he is, but the name that he has which is put in issue." Cf. United States v. Corrigan, (2d)
Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 641 at 645, where the court said, "The doctrine of 'opening the
door' is an application of the principle of 'completeness'; that is, if one party to litigation puts
in evidence part of a document, or a correspondence or a conversation, which is detrimental
to the opposing party, the latter may introduce the balance of the document, correspondence
or conversation in order to explain or rebut the adverse inferences which might arise from
the fragmentary or incomplete character of the evidence introduced by his adversary."
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The statement generally made that evidence admissible for a limited legitimate
purpose cannot be excluded because it is incompetent or prejudicial for another purpose10 provides very little aid in the present case. Indeed, it does
little more than beg the question, for the crucial inquiries are whether evidence such as that present here is admissible and whether it is for a limited
legitimate purpose. However, when the evidence is used solely to impeach
the credibility of a witness or the accused, it appears that courts admit evidence, otherwise inadmissible for one reason or another, almost automatically.11
Perhaps it can be said that the principal case represents a retreat from the
broad area of the Weeks doctrine. In the final analysis, however, it appears
that the Supreme Court balanced the policy considerations suggested earlier
in this writing and concluded that the private interest involved was not meritorious. While the government should not be able to make affirmative use
of evidence unlawfully seized, the defendant, on the other hand, should not
be allowed to perjure himself and use the protection of the Weeks doctrine
to cover that perjury.12 Surely this is a compelling policy consideration.

Ira A. Brown, Jr.

10 1 W1GMORI!, EvmENcE, 3d ed., §13
11 See Dowling Bros. Distilling Co. v.

(1940).
United States, (6th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d)
353, cert. den. 328 U.S. 848, 66 S.Ct. 1120 (1946), rehearing den. 329 U.S. 820, 67
S.Ct. 29 (1946); United States v. Skidmore, (7th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 604.
12 See the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the principal case at 65, where he states:
"It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence
unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can tum the illegal
method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an
extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment."

